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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
cial consciousness, a deepening sense of public responsibility-these abstract
social attitudes and opinions may have a powerful effect on the subsequent
decision. Such factors may not be immediately important, but a quarter
of a century may prove them significant in the highest degree.
W. E. S., '33.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WITNESSES-COMPULSION OVER ABSENT NATION-
As.-Harry M. Blackmer, a citizen of the United States, found it con-
venient to absent himself from the country when his testimony was wanted
in the investigation of the Monmouth Oil Company leases, commonly known
as the Teapot Dome Affair. He refused to answer letters rogatory issuing
from the District Court of Wyoming to a Court in France. Subsequently,
Congress passed a bill known as the Walsh Act, providing a method of com-
pelling attendance of witnesses absent in a foreign country. 28 U. S. C. A.
secs. 712-717. Blackmer was served with a subpoena by a United States
consul in France but refused to return. He was subsequently cited for
contempt and on failure to appear in that proceeding was fined $60,000.
These measures were taken pursuant to and in accordance with the Walsh
Act. Blackmer's attorneys contested the constitutionality of the statute.
Held, that there was sufficient personal jurisdiction over the citizen domi-
ciled in a foreign country to authorize service of an extraterritorial sub-
poena ordering him to appear and testify under penalty of a fine, which
could be satisfied out of property sequestrated simultaneously with service
of an order to show cause. Blackmer v. United States (Ct. of App. D. C.
1931) 49 F. (2d) 523. A review is now pending in the Supreme Court.
It is generally held that a court in one jurisdiction cannot compel at-
tendance of a witness resident in another jurisdiction. State v. Pagels
(1887) 92 Mo. 300, 4 S. W. 931; Fidelity Trust and Casualty Co. v. Johnson
(1894) 72 Miss. 333; State v. Murphy (1896) 48 S. C. 1, 25 S. E. 43. A
subpoena issued in one state and served in another is invalid. State V. Huff
(1901) 161 Mo. 459, 61 S. W. 900. A court cannot compel attendance of a
witness resident in a foreign country. Tyre v. Wilkes (1853) 10 U. C.
Q. B. 639; Patchin v. Davis (1873) 18 U. C. Q. B. 46. Federal district
courts compel attendance of witnesses resident outside their district, only
when they reside within one hundred miles of the place of holding court.
28 U. S. C. A. sec. 654; United States v. Stein (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1929) 177
F. 479; United States v. Southern Pacific (D. C. Cal. 1916) 230 F. 270.
The legislatures of various states have sought means of compelling testi-
mony of absent or nonresident witnesses, and have generally accomplished
this by providing for the taking of depositions by commissioners. R. S.
Mo. (1929) sec. 1754; R. S. Ill. (Cahill, 1929) sec. 26. The holding in the
principal case seems to present a means whereby the attendance of absent
witnesses may be enforced. New York has already passed a similar statute
which is being tested in the present New York City municipal investigation.
N. Y. C. P. A. sec. 406. However, the view has been urged that state
statutes following the Federal statute would be void, as state powers unlike
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those of the Federal government do not extend beyond its borders. (1929)
B. U. L. REv. 143.
The Walsh Act and the holding of the Appeals Court of the District of
Columbia are based on the theory that the United States possesses a species
of jurisdiction over non-resident citizens. This jurisdiction is presumed be-
cause of the reciprocal obligations which a citizens owes his country while
abroad, and the obligation of the state to protect him. Minor v. Happerset
(1875) 21 U. S. 162; Luria v. United States (1913) 213 U. S. 9. This
extraterritorial jurisdiction is not a new principle but has been used in
previous cases. Certain criminal laws, designed to prevent acts injurious
to the government and capable of perpetration in any locality, have been
held to apply to citizens while in foreign countries. United States v. Bow-
man (1922) 260 U. S. 94. Also, Congress has been held to have power to
levy an income tax on a citizen domiciled abroad and upon income from
property situate abroad. Cook v. Tait (1924) 265 U. S. 47. The princi-
ple has been stated in the CONFLICT OF LAWS, RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst.
1930) P. F. D. No. 1, sec. 86: "A state which in the law of nations has
standing as a nation can exercise through its courts jurisdiction over its
nationals although they are not domiciled within the state."
As an additional basis for sustaining a species of jurisdiction over the
person of absent citizens, reference is made in the opinion of the court to
the ancient exercise of the King's prerogative writ of return. This writ
when served on an absent subject compelled him to return to the kingdom
at once. Upon failure to obey, the King could seize and hold his lands
and upon his return, levy a fine against him. 1 BL. CoImx.* 266; 4 BL.
ComI.* 122. But there was no provision for a forfeiture of the fugitive's
property. It was expressly recognized that the King could hold the lands
and collect the rents and profits but could not transfer the land to another
subject during the fugitive's absence, and the King could only proceed to
enforce a penalty when the subject returned. Bartue and Dutchess of Suf-
folk's Case (1559) 73 Eng. Repr. 388; Kr'owles v. Luce (1579) 72 Eng.
Repr. 473. The present law goes further than the ancient prerogative, in
that it provides for, in effect, a forfeiture of the citizen's property while he
is yet abroad.
In the principal case the court says, "He (Blackmer) knew, or should
have known, that it is as much his duty to yield his testimony in the govern-
ment's efforts to uncover fraud as it would be his duty to bear arms in de-
fense of his country." The duty is thus made a paramount one, since the
power of a national state to compel a citizen to bear arms in defense of his
country is beyond question. Jacobson v. Mass. (1905) 197 U. S. 11.
That the decision is a necessary and salutary one cannot be gainsaid.
Recent disclosures of scandal and corruption require a clear recognition of
extraterritorial powers of compulsion over fugitive witnesses. No princi-
ple of jurisdiction is violated since the judgment was one quasi in rem, to
be satisfied only out of property attached at the outset of the proceedings.
There was no attempt to give it the effect of a judgment in personam. The
statute therefore could not be attacked on the ground of due process in this
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respect. Pennoyer v. Neff (1877) 95 U. S. 714. Nor was there any of-
fense to the dignity or sovereignty of any foreign country, nor any at-
tempt to exercise in that country any attribute of sovereignty, since the
consul serving notice acted as a mere messenger whose function was to
notify and not coerce.
For discussion of the case and problems raised see: note (1931) 40 YALE
L. J. 1325; note (1931) MICH. L. REv. 137. For a discussion of the Walsh
Act see note (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 204. V. P. K., '33.
CORPORATIONS-ACCOUNTING PRACTICES-STATUTE IMPOSING INDIVIDUAL
LIABILITY AS PENALTY.-The statutes of Massachusetts require that cor-
porations submit each year a statement of their financial status, subscribed
by the president, treasurer and a majority of the directors. Mass. Gen.
Laws (1921) c. 156 secs. 36 and 47. If a false return is made, the sub-
scribers can be held individually liable for the corporate debts. Mass. Gen.
Laws (1921) ibid. The application of this unique law (peculiar to Mas-
sachusetts) is illustrated in the case of United Oil Co., Inc. v. Eager
Transportation Co. et al. (Mass. 1930) 173 N. E. 692. The statement
to be returned must include a balance sheet listing as specifically pro-
vided by Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) c. 156 sec. 47, assets such as ma-
chinery, furniture, and liabilities such as reserve and capital stock. The
defendant corporation complied with the statute by listing as assets items
including "autos, trucks and teams" and as liabilities "reserves." As there
was no separate account for depreciation on "autos, trucks and teams," it
was placed indiscriminately in "reserve." The court deemed the balance
sheet false because there was no such differentiation and held the defend-
ant individually liable on the plaintiff's debt claim, on the theory that
persons who might deal with the company might be misled into believing
that it had attachable assets worth $14,735, whereas less the depreciation,
the "trucks" etc., were worth only $1,000.
This conclusion of the court seems rather difficult to sustain. The
statute requires only a listing of "reserve" with which provision there was
exact compliance, no provision being made requiring a separation of re-
serve for depreciation on each asset. Nor do the cases cited by the court
support its finding. Heard v. Pictorial Press (1903) 182 Mass. 530, 65
N. W. 901, is a case in which the directors knowingly valued $10,000 in
patent rights as worth $120,000. In the Empire Laboratories, Inc. v. Golden
Distributing Corporation (1929) 266 Mass. 418, 164 N. E. 772, $47,000 in
advances were listed as tangible merchandise. Both of the above cases
clearly show fraudulent practices. Then, too, in the instant case the de-
fendants were following an accepted accounting practice, regarded in mak-
ing use of a general "reserve" account. To obtain the actual value of the
assets, only the deduction of the reserve amount from the total depreciable
asset is necessary. Admittedly, it would be more convenient to designate
separately each reserve, but it is certainly not fraudulent nor deserving of
penalty to use such a widely sanctioned method. J. G. G., '32.
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